Florida Summary Judgment Motions: The Burden of Proof & Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e)

By: Krithika Venugopal, Esq.

A motion for summary judgment is a valuable tool in Florida litigation. Litigants use it to resolve all or part of a case before trial, which tends to be more time consuming and expensive than a summary judgment hearing. The standard procedure involves one party filing the motion and the other filing a response explaining why summary judgment should not be granted.

In Haramis v. Craft, No. 4D2025-1904, 2026 LX 437557 (4th DCA Aug. 19, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed whether a party seeking summary judgment had presented sufficient evidence even when the opposing party’s written response was stricken.

What Happened in Haramis v. Craft?

In Haramis, the appellant had an easement agreement with the previous owners of his neighbors’ (the appellees) property. The agreement gave the appellant near exclusive use of a portion of the neighboring property for, among other things, ingress, egress, and landscaping. The agreement required the appellant to comply with all applicable laws, ordinances, and regulations.

The appellees sued after the appellant placed certain items on the land subject to the easement, including concrete columns. The appellees subsequently moved for summary judgment. With regard to the columns, the appellees argued that the installation exceeded the scope of the appellant’s rights under the easement agreement and that the appellant had failed to obtain a valid permit. The appellees conceded that the appellant had initially obtained a permit; this permit had later been revoked and the appellant had not obtained a new one.

The appellant filed a response, but this response was stricken by the trial court, thus rendering the response legally ineffective. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellees. With regard to the columns, the trial court stated they exceeded the scope of the appellant’s easement rights and that they were installed in violation of the town’s laws, ordinances or regulations. The court ordered the appellant to remove the columns.

It should be noted at this juncture that the trial court could have “considered the facts asserted in the [appellees’] motion and proper exhibits to be undisputed” under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e)(2). But the trial court did not do so. Instead, the trial court’s judgment stated that its legal conclusions were “[b]ased on the summary judgment evidence presented[.]”

Why the Fourth District Reversed

The Fourth District reversed the ruling on the concrete columns, finding the appellees’ evidence to be insufficient for summary judgment. For one, the appellees had not established that the columns exceeded the scope of the easement agreement. The Fourth District thought the columns could have been covered by the agreement’s provision for landscaping (based on dictionary definitions of landscaping).

With regard to the second argument, the Fourth District held that the appellees had not identified “a single law, ordinance, or regulation allegedly violated by [the appellant’s] installation of the columns.” In fact, the evidence “seemingly indicated” that the columns had been completed and inspected before the expiration or revocation of the permit initially obtained by the appellant.

Further, the appellees had not explained why the appellant was obligated to obtain a permit “to leave already-completed concrete columns in place.” Nor had they identified “any law, ordinance, or regulation requiring a building permit to build concrete columns in the first place.” Thus, the appellees failed to independently present evidence warranting summary judgment; the lack of a response from the appellant did not guarantee their success.

What Haramis Means for Florida Litigants

The Fourth District’s discussion of Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e)(2) poses an interesting question: whether the appellees would have prevailed if the trial court had deemed their factual assertions undisputed under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e)(2).

To recall, it was the trial court’s decision to base its judgment on the appellees’ evidence that led the Fourth District to consider the adequacy of that evidence on appeal. If the trial court had instead applied Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e)(2) to simply deem all of the appellees’ assertions undisputed, the Fourth District’s analysis may have been different.

For Florida litigants, Haramis offers at least two lessons. First, it highlights the need to remember one’s burden of proof at all stages of litigation. If the appellees had collected the evidence necessary for their claim concerning the concrete columns and presented such evidence at summary judgment, they may not have lost on appeal. Second, the reference to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(e)(2) brings attention to a procedural mechanism that should be considered in any summary judgment proceeding. Depending on whether you are seeking or opposing summary judgment, the rule presents a possible advantage or an unavoidable hazard.